INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of Stude



LIM: TED OFFICIAL USE 57-M 17802 Control: Action OCTOBER 24. 1962 Rec'd: EUR 3:17 PM FROM: BONN Info SS TO: Secretary of State G SP NO: 1213, OCTOBER 24, 5 PM L SAL BTF PRIORITY ARA IO ACTION DEPARTMENT 1213, INFORMATION BERLIN 300, LONDON 298, DAC PARIS 283, BRUSSELS 56, THE HAGUE 37. P USIA PARIS ALSO PASS USRO. STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE NSC INR GERMAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY CONTINUES BE MONCPOLIZED BY QUESTION. CIA WITH SPECIAL MEETINGS OF PARTY COMMITTEES AND OF DEFENSE NSA COUNCIL (CHANCELLOR, ERHARD, SCHROEDER, STRAUSS, STARKE, OSD HOECHERL) OCTOBER 24. AND BUNDESTAG FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ARMY OCT 26. MAVY AIR IN STATEMENT TO GOVERNMENT COALITION COMMITTEE OCT 23 ADENAUER $\Gamma:\mathbb{R}$ EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PRESIDENT'S DECISION WAS APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY. CHANCELLOR SAID AVAILABLE INFORMATION HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT PRESIDENT COULD NOT HAVE ACTED STHERWISE. BECAUSE USSR HAD BEGUN CONSTRUCTION IN HASTE OF ROCKET BASE CUBA WHICH COULD BE MORTAL DANGER USA.

FDP CHAIRMAN MENDE HAS TOLD EMBASSY THAT HE AND FDP HAD FULL UNDERSTANDING FOR AMERICAN POSITION, AND INTIMATED THAT STATEMENT PUT OUT YESTERDAY BY FDP PRESS SERVICE (EMBTEL 1203) REPRESENTED HIS PERSONAL VIEWS. MENDE SAID ALL THREE PARTIES WOULD MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY WITH UNITED STATES, THOUGH THEY RECOGNIZE THAT AS CONSEQUENCE OF AMERICAN ACTION SITUATION IN BERLIN LIKELY TO BECOME MORE CRITICAL. MENDE CONSIDERED SUPPORT OF OAS MOST IMPRESSIVE.

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-2- 1213, OCTOBER 24, 5 PM FROM BONN

SPD BUNDESTAG GROUP PUBLISHED OCTOBER 23 FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF STATEMENT ON CUBA BY DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FRITZ ERLER AT MEETING OF FRAKTION: DECISION OF AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO BLOCKADE ARMS DELIVERIES TO CUBA SHOWS U.S. WORLD POWER NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT WITHOUT ACTION A FURTHER EXTENSION OF SOVIET POWER.

ONE MUST HAVE UNDERSTANDING FOR PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR PRESIDENT JUST AS AMERICANS HAVE UNDERSTANDING FOR PROBLEMS AND FOR THE SITUATION IN BERLIN. ERLER CHARACTERIZED DECISION ABOVE ALL AS MODERATE BECAUSE IT DID NOT AFFECT COMMERCE. BUT ONLY DELIVERIES OF ARMS.

ERLER EXPRESSED FOLLOWING VIEWS EMBASSY: SPD ACCEPTS U.S. EVALUATION OF NECESSITY FOR ACTION. IN ITS PERIOD IN OFFICE KENNEDY GOVERNMENT, AND PRESIDENT PERSONALLY, HAD ABUNDANTLY DEMONSTRATED PATIENCE AND COOLNESS UNDER PRESSURE. SPD RECONGIZED POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR BERLIN, BUT ON QUESTION WHETHER SOV ACTIONS IN BERLIN WOULD BE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE U.S. CUBA ACTION, THERE WAS DIVISION OF OPINION, SOME HOLDING THAT SOVIETS WOULD HOLD BACK, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT. ERLER SAID OAS SUPPORT OF U.S. HAD MADE STRONG IMPRESSION AND WAS GREAT DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS. HE SURMISED THAT KENNEDY -KHRUSHCHEV MEETING NOW VIRTUALLY CERTAIN, WITH PROBABILITY THAT ALL OUTSTANDING WORLD PROBLEMS WOULD COME UNDER DISCUSSION. HE PERSONALLY FAVORS SUCH DISCUSSION, HAVING ALWAYS DIFFERED FROM CHANCELLOR ON USEFULNESS OF DISCUSSIONS LIMITED TO BERLIN. HE NOTED IN AN ASIDE THAT SCHROEDER MORE FLEXIBLE ON THIS POINT. ERLER SAID HE MIGHT VENTURE ONE PIECE OF ADVICE: NAMELY, THAT UNITED STATES SHOULD AVOID SELF-JUSTIFICATION IN ITS POSTURE ABROAD. AMERICAN PATIENCE AND RESTRAINT UNDER EXTREME PROVOCATION OVER A LONG PERIOD WERE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR.

IN EMBASSY JUDGMENT, GENERAL REACTION HERE APPEARS TO BE ONE OF FULL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR U.S. MOVE, TEMPERED BY SOME FORESEEABLE CONCERN RE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR BERLIN. SOME TENDENCY TO HOPE THAT FIRMNESS OF U.S. POLICY

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ON CUBA MAY IN FACT HELP DETER SOVIETS FROM MOVING AGAINST WEST BERLIN, THOUGH GERMAN OPINION APPEARS BRACED FOR LATTER CONTINGENCY. SOME OPINION THAT U.S. ACTION OVER CUBA NOT DRASTIC ENOUGH, AND THUS RUNS DANGER BOTH OF FAILING TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE AND POSSIBLY ALSO ENCOURAGING SOVIETS TO PROCEED AGAINST WEST BERLIN.

AS EVIDENCE FEDREP COOPERATIVENESS, FEDERAL PRESS OFFICE TODAY INFORMED EMBASSY THAT THEY WOULD BE GLAD TO GEAR ENTO THEIR OWN PUBLIC MEDIA SYSTEM ANY GUIDANCES FROM WASHINGTON WHICH WE WISHED THEM TO USE.

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